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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
STATE OF u T.AH, 
Plaintiff a:nd Respo·ndent, 
\S. 
E. B. ERWL'. fuRRY FixcH and 
R .. 0. PEARcE, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Case No. 6200 
Petition and Brief on Rehearing 
of Appellant, E. B. Erwin 
APPELL..lXT E. B. ERWIN''S BETITIOIN 
FOR REHE·ARING. 
(Original s·erved and filed.) 
·Comes now E. B. Erwin, defendant and appellant 
herein, and pursuant to law and the rules of this Court 
respectfully requests and petitions this HonorabJe Court 
to grant a rehearing of and to re-·examine the above en-
titled cause. In support of his petition and for his 
grounds therefor, appellant respectfully alleges that this 
H·onorable C·ourt erred in its ·opinion handed do.wn in this 
cause in the particulars hereinafter set out. Accompany-
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2 
ing this petition is a brief o·f authorities relied upon in 
support hereof. 
I . 
. The Court erroneously rea!ched the conclusion: 
(a) That the corpus delecti had be-en proved. 
(b) That the corpus delecti could he proved by con-
sidering as evidence one inference bas·ed upon 
. another inference. 
II. 
The Court erroneously held : 
(a) That a conversation of a. certain witness was 
admissiible in evidence to show a claimed admission of 
appellant when it had not been shown and was not shown 
that the eonver.sation testified to was heard by appellant. 
(b) That appellant admitted guilt because he 
failed to make a proper answer to a statement made by 
the witne,ss Runzler that she had heard others say that 
there was money bffing paid to prote-ct crim·e and that 
appellant and others reeeived such money. 
The C·ourt erroneously he~ld ad;missible under the res 
gestae rule .c.ertain hearsay evidence which was based 
upon other hearsay evidence, thus eonsidering as com-
petent and proper evidence testimony of what'' A'' said 
"'0'' said that "D '' said. 
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IV. 
The Court decided that the numerous errors found 
in the record were not inc.onsequential and erroneously 
decided ~that said errors did not prejudice appellant. 
v. 
The Court erroneously decided that errors admitted-
ly prejudicial to appellant and repeatedly indulged in 
were cured by the adm~nition of the Court, when as a 
matter of fact the error committed was only magnified 
and emphasized by such admonition,. 
WHEREFORE, appellant prays this Honorable Court 
to rehear and reconsider the above cause and. grant t~ 
appellant such relief as on the rooord ~e is so abundantly 
entitled to. And appellant forever prays. 
BURTOX W. MussER, 
EDWARD F. RICHARDS, 
Attorneys for E. B. Erwin, 
Appellatnt and Defendant . 
. APPtE.LLANT E. B. ERWIN'S SUPPLEMENTAL 
PETITION F.QR. R;EHEARIN·G 
(Driginal s·erved and filed.) 
Comes now appellant E. B. Erwin, and consent of 
the Oonrt having been first obtained, files this his sup-
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plemental petition f.or rehearing, praying that the above 
cause be re-examined, and without waiving any of the 
grounds contained in his petition for rehearing, alleges: 
A. 
;That the Court erred in determining and finding that 
the indictment herein was sufficient to inform appellant 
of the nature and the caus-e of the accusation against him. 
B. 
That the Court erred in determining that the in-
dictment was sufficient under the constitution and laws 
of the ~State of Utah. 
WHEREFORE, appellant respectfully prays that this 
Honorable Court consider the a:hove in detennining 
whether it will re-examine and rehear this ~cause. 
BuRTON W. MussER, 
EDWARD F. RICHARDS, 
Att-orneys for Appellant, 
E. B. Erwin. 
The record in this case is in many respects very un-
satisfactory. It is long, complicated, contains many 
ambiguities, and no doubt taxed the patienee of the writer 
of the opinion. In many respe-cts the record is unusual. 
The f.orm of the indictment, the nature of the alleged 
proof, the character of the ~ritnesses, the disposition of 
the defendants, and the obvi·ous determinations of the 
trial judge-all ·Contributed to making a difficult task 
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m{)re difficult and lead to mhnmderstandings conePrning 
the facts and the applicable law. 
This appeal is in no sense a. personal matter bet\\reen 
counsel for appellants and the Court. ...-\.s officers of the 
Court \\e urge with all of the persuasiYeness at our conl-
mand that the Court re-exanrine this cause and grant us 
an opportunity to re-argue it t!() the C·ourt so that by 
the process of meeting face to fa-ce and asking and an-
swering questions, we can come more nearly doing justice 
than has been done. In the follo-wing pages we give the 
Court our best thought and attention to numerous parts 
of the opinion we think demand attention. · However, we 
hasten to admit that \\e haven't exhaustively treated the 
seores of errors found in the opinion. There are up-
wards of thirty. 
ARGUMENT. 
I. 
THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY REACHED THE CONCLUSION: 
(a) THAT THE CORPUS DELECTI HAD BEEN PROVED, 
(b' THAT THE CORPUS DELECTI WAS PROVEID BY CON-
SIDERING AS EVIDENCE ONE INFERENCE BASED UPON 
ANOTHER INFERENCE. 
(a) THE .CORPUS DELECTI WAS NEVER PROVED. 
On page five of the opinion the Court says: 
In order to support a verdict the state must pr-ove 
the corpus dele<eti; that is, that a crime was com-
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' mitted. In this case it must be .shoWn that- th~re 
was such· an agreement as was >alleged in the in~ 
diotment between s-ome -of the defendants and that 
. one . of the overt a·cts alleged has. been co'inmitted 
. and this without the aid of the admissions of th~ 
defenrla;nts themselves. (Italics indicate emphasis 
suppl~ed -by. the writer unless it otherwise ap-
pears.) · 
The opinion then reviews the evidence of certain 
witness·es to show that appellant entered into the con-
spira~cy ·dharged and committed the overt acts alleged, 
~nd refers to the testimony of the witnesses H-olt (page 
5), Record (page 6), and Kempner (page 6). After re-
vi·eWing this· testimony the opinion says: 
This ·evidence is sufficient to prove the corpus 
dele·cti. While there is no direct testimony of any 
express agreement on the part of defendants to 
allow these illegal activlit~ies to operate, the only 
.. , inference that can be drawn fro-m the fact these 
operators paid the money to Holt and Stube;ck 
under the circumstances detailed, that there was 
an u·nd·erstanding that they would he allowed to 
opera:te their illegal businesses. 
The evidence the opinion ref·ers to is not sufffi.cient 
to prove the eorpus delecti. Appellant is presumed to 
be inri.·o·een:t of this charge until he is proved to be guilty 
beyond a reas-onable doubt. That presumption is never 
ov_erco1ne.; in this record. If the testimony above referred 
' (,•,, I I ·- - • •' ' . ' 
t-o proves· anything, it only pr~oves that appellant was 
Mayor; that upon his re-0omm·endation Mr. :minch was 
uiianimously appointed Chief of P:olice by the entire City 
Cominissio-n·; that houses of vice operated and that they 
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had ~~!.a~~-)~n:g_ b~or~.{ an<l loug ~~ .. fter :.the. alleged 
agreeme11t: that H.Wt demanded.·· that c.ertain. underworld 
women pay him ·money; that the ,vitness Sn1ith·:·said he 
.. ·'.~~~ _;- . -~ '. . ~ .... ,: -~{. .' ll3d: heard somebody else say thaf tl~ere. \\yas a pay-off 
in Salt-Lake City and that the M·ayor and the Chief of 
Police ~ere participating in it : that ltecor~ s~id that 
Pearce said that the Mayor had instructed him ('Record) 
to make collections from gambling houses ; and- that 
Kempner said that he went with Abe -Stubeck from one 
licensed card room to another licensed card room. whare 
~lle'ciions were made, and that St~be~k told Ke:mpner 
that he t()ok the money over to Ben Harm{)n, who d_ivided 
it up with Erwin and his crowd. The decisio·n th_en con-
- - .. ,. 
tains the following paragraph which 1s not attributed 
to any particular witness : 
About the middle of J anu_ary, ·1938, Harmon 
telephoned Holt and asked him to_ pick him up, 
which he did, and while driving around: Harmon 
said, 'For God's sake (it-ali'es ·C{)uyt's), .don't 
make any more collections ; Harris and Lee got 
hold of Pierce and accused him of being in the 
pay-off. Don't take anything from anyone any 
·.more; as things might blow over.' ' 
-~ter revi_ewjng the :~hove evid~n~~ the. o:pi:~ti_o~ ~~-n­
.t~ins this_ whoHy· unjustified state)Il~nt:. _. ~. : 
• • • • ~ 4 ,, • • • ~ ~:: .:. • ·~· • : .1.""• I J :' .. . \.~ C': t •• 
-- •. ~ _-, {' . . : " .. ,., ~ . . : 
~his -evidence is sufficient to prove the 0orpus delecti. · · · · -· · · · ·· \/.. · ,. · 
- '' 
What is the body .of the erime 1 It is .the ~greement. 
~here is no evidence in. the rooord the Oourt . revie-wed, 
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or elsewhere for that matter, that appellant ever en-
tered into the agreement charged. The ·only part of the 
evidence referred to that connects appellant Wlith any 
phase of any offense is the testimony that Reeord said 
that Pearce said that the Mayor said something ahout 
·making a oollection; and the testimony that Holt said 
that Smith said that Smith had heard that the Mayor 
and the Chief had been in on a pay -off. No:vv that isn't 
independent evidence to prove the fact that appellant 
entered into the agreement. The only possrible probative 
force it can have is to torture it into .being an admission 
·on the part of ap·peHant that appellant had entered into 
the agreement. It even isn't an admission. But the 
opinion s·eems to construe it as being such. This evi-
dence should not be considered by the c·ourt until the 
corpus delecti had been proved. It cannot be considered 
by the Court a.s being proof of the corpus deleoti. It is, 
after all, only an admission. This testimony should be 
entirely disregarded until the corpus delecti ·had been 
proved. 
(b) THE CORPUS DELEIGTI CANNOT BE PROVEU BY CON· 
SIDERI1NG A'S E~VLDENGE ONE INFERENCE· 'VHI'CH IS 
BASED UPON ANOTHER INFERE·NCE. 
The Court se·elned to have abandoned the idea that 
the testin1ony referred to constituted adn1issions. The 
opinion states : 
While there is no ·drirect testimony of any express 
agreement on the part of the defendants to allow 
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these iUegal aetiYities to operate, tht.' only i·nfer-
ence that can be dra"yn from the fact that these 
operators paid the mone~y to H-olt and Stubeck 
under the circumstanees is that there "·as an un-
derstanding that they would be allowed to oper·ate 
their illegal business. 
The record is plain that these houses of Yiee operated 
lt>ng before and long after the alleged conspiracy. From 
the testimony that money was paid to Holt the Court 
draws the i·nfe-re·nf:e. (1) that the -operators of the 
houses of nee were allowed to operate. Now, upon that 
inference the opinion draws the further inference, (2) 
that houses of vice were allo-wed to operate by reason of 
the agreement alleged. .A.s yet there is no proof of the 
agreement, so the opinion infers one thing and from that 
inference infers another thing, and after indulging in 
the second inference concludes that an agreement had 
been proved. 
There is no proof in the record that when the m·oney 
was paid to Holt he told the operators of the houses -of 
vice that by reason of making the payments they could 
.operate. There is no proof to show that the houses of 
vice operated pursuant to any alleged agreement. But 
af.ter going through all this, the opinion draws another 
inference. It says: 
The operators of gambling houses and houses of 
prostitution do not pay police officers money for 
nothing. 
Upon that inference the opinion draws the further 
inference that the operators would be protected in their 
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oJierations,- and- upon. that inference the opinion draws 
the further -inference that the inferred proteetion came 
about by 'reason :of the :conspiracy alleged. 
The opinil.on further states: 
The ewdence shows that about five_ hundred dol-
lars was collected each month for a period of six 
mo·nths at·>one time- and eight months the last 
tim·e. 
From this the opinion draws the inference that such 
' .. ' 
payments d'o not show a shakedown by an individual of-
ficer. .And. upon- that inference draws the further in-
ference t4at there,must have been an understanding of 
those higher up~-: And having drawn those two wholly 
unwarranted inferences, the opinion 0oncludes that the 
corpus dele~cti ha-d· been amply proved. The opini.on states 
immed!iately following the foregoing re.citations: 
Thus, the corpus delecti is amply proved. 
As a matter of -fact, proof of the corpus dele·cti does 
not f.ollow. It .cannot be said to follow without giving 
full weight to inferences bas-ed upon other inferences, 
and wi tho_ut asserting that the corpus delecti can be 
prov~d ~olelr by the alleged admissions of the parties 
eoncerned. 
The inferences drawn by the court we respectfully 
edntend are not justified by the facts upon which they 
·are hase-d. ·The 1aw "l.s well settled that one conclusion 
,: .,• . ' . 
'-
or inference cannot be based upon another co1iclusion or 
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~~r~n~e: State r .. , Pqte-llo. 40 lTtah, 56, 119 -~ac~ ,-10~3. 
In this case the defendant \\~as charged 'vith having 
stolen a. horse. There ·was evidence to sho\v that the 
defendant had possession of the_ horse,. but_. there was 
no evidence to sho"'"" "~hether the horse had wandered 
from the range or been driven the~eir~m. _ In speaking 
upon the question of presumptions and inferences the 
court stated : 
It is a familiar r-ule that one presumption or in-
ference ca-nnot rest upon OJrWther mere inference 
or preswmpti&n. It can only rest on proven facts. 
In accordance with that rnie, the inference or 
presumption referred to in. the. statute is also 
based, not on mere il}ference, .but on declared or 
proven facts. Let it be assumed that the evidence 
sufficiently shows that the defendant's. expl~na­
tion of his possession w.as not satisfactory. Do 
the proved facls on the part of_ the state also 
prove the larceny? We think ·not. • * * All 
it showed was that the horse got out, strayed 
away, and four or five months' thereafter was 
found in the po-ssession -of t:}l~ acoo.sed, whp said 
he bought him from an IndiaA:, an(! who; r~fu.sed 
to give him up. Of eourse, the_) state seeks to draw 
the inference that- the hoTse ·-strayed to the range 
sQme s~_ or eight- miles from the -~-defend~nt's 
. place, and that some ·One there took and d~·OV€ him 
-a way; and, since the h-oTse was found -in the :de-
-f~ndant's _ poss~ssion, the. f:grth~er infe_re~·ce is 
sought thaf the defendant took-'and drove, or aided 
-another to- take and drive; the horse · from ·the 
range. B1rbt this is merely res~ting an infere'nce or 
a presumption upon am i'nfereni:e or a. preswmp-
: ·tion. · 
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· · In the instant. ease the state proved that the opera-
' : - - . 
tors of houses ·of vice paid money to H·olt. . No further 
facts were proved in ·either ease, and in both cases the 
c~urt had endeavored to base the remaining elements ·of 
' . 
the- crime by drawing inferences from. the one fact 
proved. From that fact the opinion starts into motion 
a ·series of inferences which result in an unwarranted 
ipse dixit of the write-r of the opinion. The opinion can-
not arrive at the ·conclusion it did arrive at without 
wholly relying on inferences. 
The question of inferenees is again fully discussed 
by this court in the case . of Bt'ate v. Judd, 7 4 Utah 398, 
2'79 P-a:c. 95,3. See also Utah Foundry and M~achine C·om-
pany v. Utah Gas and Coke, 4;2 Utah 5~33, 133 P·ac. 1173; 
Busse v. Murray Meat and Livestock Company, 45 Utah 
596, 147 Pac. 62'6; K~a,rren v. Bair, 63 Utah 344, 225 Pa:c .. 
1049, 95 A. L. R. 1'6'2. 
In New York Life Insurance Company v. McNeely, 
(Ariz.) 79 P1a!c. ('2d) 948, the .Supreme Court of Arizona 
discusses this principle as applicable to a ·civil case. It 
also considers the s~tatement of D·ean Wign1ore on this 
rule. The Arizona ease has a third of a column filled 
with authoritie-s from many, if not all, jurisdictions in the 
United States, holding that ''one inference cannot rest 
upon another inference.'' At pa.ge 904 of the above 
report the Court says : 
The eour:ts, however, have always insisted that the 
life, liberty and property of a citizen should not 
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13 
be taken away on possibilities, eonjectures, or 
even, generally speaking, on bare probability. 
Again: 
This rule is not based on an ap·plica.tion of the 
exact. rules of l-ogic, but upon the pragmatic prin-
ciple that a certain quantum of proof is arbitrari-
ly required when the courts are asked to take 
away life, liberty, or property. 
So the evidence here complained of is not admissible 
and is not eompetent~ To hold otherwise you must ove·r-
rule State v. Potello; State v. Judd; Utah Foundry a;nd 
Machine Company v. Utah Gas and Coke; Busse v. Mur-
ray Jfeat omd Li·restock Company; am,d Karren v. Blair, 
supra. In his third edition on evidence, paragraph 41, 
Wigmore refers to the MeX eely case, supra, and· ap-
proves the rule laid down by that court. 
The old rille in- 1 Wigmore on E·vidence, paragraph 
41, is based on a perfectly silly argument. For instance 
the author says: 
For example, on a charge of murder, the defend-
ant's gun is found discharged; from this· we infer 
that he discharged it; and from this we infer 
that it was his bullet which struck and killed the 
deceased. 
Again: 
Or, the defendant is shown to have been sharpen-
ing the knife; from this we have the design that 
he intended to use it; and from this we argue that 
the fatal stab was the result of this design. 
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The above statements are merely the unfounded and 
unsupported statements of the author. If they are true 
then everyone owning a gun and everyone found sharpen-
ing a knife is liable to be convicted where a shot is fi-red 
or a person is stabbed. 
II. 
THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY HE.LD: (a) T'HAT A CONVERSA-
TION OF A CERTAIN WTTN.ESIS WAS ADMISSIBLE. IN 
EV:UDE:NICE TO SHOW A CLAIME-D ADMISSION OF AP-
PELLANT WHIDN IT HAD NOT BEEN SHOWN AND WAS 
NOT SHOWN THAT T'HE CONVERSATION TESTIFIED TO 
WAS H.:IDAR'D BY APPE'LLANT. (b) THAT APPELLANT 
ADMITTEID GU:ULT B:IDCAUSE HE FA!lLEill TO MAKE A 
PROPER AN!S'WER TO A BTATEiMENT MADE BY THE 
W'I'TNESS RUNZLER THAT SHE H~AD HEARD OTHERS SAY 
THAT THFJRE, WIAS MONE:Y BEINO PAID TO PROTECT 
. ~ 
CRIME A:NU THAT AP·PELL.A!NT AND OTHERS RE:CElVED 
SU!CH MONE,Y. 
(a) The silence of appellant at the conversation · 
testified to by the witness Harris was not an admission 
and should not have been received by the court on the 
theory that it oonstituted an admission on the part of 
the appellant. 
Mr. Harris testified that on a certain date a group 
of men were invited to a luncheon at the Alta Club. That 
amongst those persons were certain newspaper men, Mr. 
Finch and Mr. Erwin. That after the luncheon had been 
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coneluded, Mr. Harris entered the room and parti(~ipated 
in certain oonYersations. The record shtnYs that the 
table around whieh they sat 'vas about as large as one 
of counc.il tables in the courtroom and that Mr. Er,vin 
sat a.t one end of the table a.nd Mr. Finch, the host, at the 
other end thereof and that Mr. Harris sat by Mr. Fish. 
It -was at this conversation that Mr. Harris made 
certain statements~ w.hich for the la·ck of a proper an-
swer the opinion holds constituted an admission on the 
part of appellant. 
On cross examination the -witness was asked if as 
a matter of fact he didn't write the figures that were 
involved on a piece of paper and then shDw it to Mr. Fish, 
and the witness frankly stated that he might have done 
that. 
There is no endence in the record that appellant 
heard the alleged a~usation. Mr. Finch denied that he 
heard it. 
With respect., to this alleged admission, the opinion 
states: 
The circumstances des·cribed would make it al-
most imp-ossible for them not "to hear what was 
said. It is true that on cross examination Harrjs 
said that he probably wrote the figures 750 and 
500 on a piece -of paper and showed .. them to Mr. 
Fish sitting next to him, but -this does. not con-
tradict his original testimony, nor m_ 0/Y!Y · way 
mdicate that the defenda;nt' might not have heard 
the iliccusatwn. · 
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. . ,The purpose Gf the testimony was to show that ·be-. 
c.ause appellant didn't vo0iferously deny what Mr. Har-
ris said he thereby ir~pliedly a·drnitted the truth of what 
Mr~ iHarris said. · .· But this s-ort of evidence is not' ad-
mis·sible on the the.ory · that it constitutes an admission 
until it clearly appears that appellant did hear it. It 
is .. a signifi.c~nt thing that the· happening occurred at a 
socia~ engagement; that appellant was further away from 
the speaker than any -other person in the room; that the 
witness said· that he might have shown the figures to 
Mr. Fish.· If you give appellant the benefit of his pre-
sumption of innocence, why not conclude that he did 
not hear it. Why assume that he beard it. 
After all, it is claimed that a certain a·ccusation was 
made in the presence of appellant; that he did not deny 
it; that he thereby admitted the truthfulness of it; and 
that thereby he admit~ted .that he had entered into a con-
spiracy as alleged in the indictment. Whereas, not know-
ing that app·ellant did hear the conversation and knowing 
that Mr. Finch testified that he did not hear the con-
vers~ition (.&lthough Mr. Finch sat much closer to the 
speaker than did appellant) why conclude tha~t appellant 
heard the eonversation and :then set in 1notion a chain 
of il}fierenees v\rith which to destroy appellant. 
In Bloomer ·v. Sta,te, 75 Arkansas 297, the lower 
court was held to have committed error by admitting in 
evidence a s'ta temen t of a "ri tness made in the presence 
of the defendant who at the time was staggering around 
the room intoxicated. This· was error he-cause the Su-
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p~eme Court held ·it 'vas not sho'vn that the defendant 
heard the· remarks. 
-__ Because of.appellant 's asserted silence "·it.h respe,ct 
tothe statement it is not show·n tha-t he heard, the· opin-
ion attributes the truth of such a statement to appellant. 
Why not assum-e that appellant did not hear it because 
if. he did hear it he would ha Ye said something about it. 
There is no testimony thai appellant looked abashed, 
hung his head, or ''flushed'' or that he stammered, or 
anything else. The testim-ony is that after the luncheon 
party broke up all walked out of- the room together as 
if nothing had occurred. 
(b) Appellant did not admit his guilt because he 
failed to make a proper answer to the statement made 
by the witnes·s Runzler. 
On page 15 of the opinion, it is -stated: 
The conversation testified to by Mrs~: Runzler, 
with Mr. E~ comes squarely within this rule. 
When the accusation was made he flushed con-
sidera;bly, and said: 'Oh, I am·aooused· of that t'oo,· 
am I?';.and immediately. changed the- subj.ect. It 
is a well-recognized fact that when a person hold-
ing the position which· Mr. Erwin held at that 
- time, as Mayor of a large city, is accused by one 
of his constituents, as testified by Mrs. Runz~er, 
and he 'is not guilty of that. accusation, he will 
usually be very positive in his denials of guilt. 
Instead of that, here he passed the m·atter off 
. very lightly and made no denial of the accusation. 
'This evidence was therefore clearly · admissible. 
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Mrs. R111nzler made no mccusation. Mrs. VooCott, 
the other person in the room, made no accusalion .. The 
trut·h is that Mrs. Runzler testified that at the time of 
~he conference Mrs. VanC'ott said that she (Mrs. V a.n-
Cotrt) had heard it rumored that there was a pay-off and 
that the mayor and the chief of police and others were 
taking part of the money. 
Was it the appell·ant's duty to deny that Mrs. Van-
:C'ott had heard the rumor~ I had heard it and I have 
heard it with respect to every mayor we have ever had 
and the rumors are all false. The mayor eouldn 't say to 
her: ''That is a lie,-you didn't hear it.'' And if he 
didn't say that it doesn't constitute an admission that 
houses of vice were being operated because they· were 
paying money to the polic.e offi·cer for protection because 
of a conspiracy entered into by app:ellant. 
The above sta;tement in the opinion is not fair. It 
isn't fair tO. appellant, nor to the writer of the opinion, 
nor to ·counsel, nor to· .court. It just isn't erickett . 
. Appellant was not accused of any erime. What if 
Mrs. VanCott said what she is alleged to have said,-
said it as if she herself did not believe it. What if she 
said it smilingly, lightly, or tripp~ingly ~ Must her hea-rer~ 
fail to "flush'', refuse to .smoke, and not change the sub-
jecf~ I am sure that if the same s'tatement were ·made 
by the same· person to each member of this court se-
parately that each member would react differently. 
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'Yhy abandon the presumption of innocence to e.on-
elude that because appellant did not make the ans\Yer 
that the writer of the opinion thought he should make, 
he thereby admitted that he was receiYing a. pay-off of 
$750, "·hieh proved that houses of Yice operated pursuant 
to an agreement to permit them to operate·? 
The opini<>n takes judieial notice of how a. pers·on 
might react and should react under certain -circum-
stances. The '\\Titer of the opinion is not justified in 
reaching the cone.lusion that from what occurred at the 
time of the conference -of Runzler and VanCott with ap-
pellant, there emerged an admission that appellant had 
entered int<> an agreement to permit houses of vice to 
operate in Salt Lake City. \\ e cited numerous cases 
in our original briefs utterly destroying this sort of 
evidence. 
III. 
THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY HELD ADMISSIBLE U·NDIDR THE 
RES GESTAE R'CLE CERTAIN HEARSAY EVIDEN"'CE 
WHICH WAS BASED UPON OTHER HEARSAY EVIDENCE, 
THUS CONSIDERING AS COMPETENT AND PROPER EVI-
DENCE TESTIMONY OF WHAT "A" SAID "C" SAID THAT 
"D'' SAID. 
T.he opinion gives full weight to evidence that is 
clearly hearsay. The testimony .of witnesses Record, Holt, 
and Kempner are fair examples as to the length to which 
the opinion has gone in respect to this matter. We will 
not iterate all of the many statments in the opinion 
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which are based on hearsay evidence, but will call atten-
tion to a few of them. 
· The witness Re-cord: 
Mr. Rec:ord testified that P·earce told him that he, 
Bearce, was responsible for Re0ord 's being placed at 
the head of the vice squad; ''that the Mayor had in-
struCJted him ( P·earce) to make -colle-ctions from gambling 
houses and other forms of vi'ce; * * *" (Opinion, 
page 6). Record further testified that he was in Mr. 
Pearce '·s office and Mr. Pearce said, "that the Mayor 
had requested him, .Pearce, to ·make colle'ctions '' (tOpin-
ion, page 9). 
The opinion states that ,., the testimony of Record 
·Clearly indicates that there was an understanding be-
tween Pearce and his associates to .allow the violation 
of la.w for money." Who ' 1'his associates" refers to is 
:not dis·closed. ''To allow the violation -of law for money" 
is not explained. 
The opinion states: 
Harmon said to him that Pearce had aucused him, 
Hoi t, of holding out. 
Again, 
T.he testimony by Holt that Harmon said that 
Harris had a'ccused P~earce of being in the pay-off 
* * * (:Opinion, page 18). 
We are not complaining as to what Pearce said to 
Record orwhat Harmon said to Holt, but we do object to 
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ha.ving. Reoord testify as to _"~hat Pea reP told ·him the 
Mayor said. and "~e object to Holt testifying· as to w·hat 
Harm.on told hin1 Pearce said,. and 'Ye obje~~t to . Holt 
testifying_ as to what Harmon said Harris accused P.earce 
of. To the writer of the opinion all of the foregoing 
evidence was admissible to show that Harmon "~as con-
nected with the conspiraey. ~·and therefore this testimony 
was admissible.'' 
The court then discusses what Kempner said Stu-
beck told him, (page 19). Kempner testified that Stu-
beck said to him: 
All the card games have to pay, but some of them 
try to welsh on it. - I take the money to Harmon, 
who divides it with Erwin and his crowd. 
The opinion states th-at under the ordinary ru1es 
those statements of Kempner were not admissible. They 
were, however, admitted. They are very prejudicial. 
The opinion thereupon cites cerrtain cases which the 
writer claims support the doctrine that such evidence 
is admissible because the statements are a part of the 
res gestae {page 19). H-owever the opinion is not satis-
fied with those authorities. On the same page of the 
opinion the writer .gives his reasons why such statements 
were not Oxlmissible but hastens to explain that they were 
admissible in the discretion of the trial court, and then 
states: 
In this ·ease the Court did not violate its discre-
tion in receiving this evidence. 
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The:ca.s.~s referred t.a ·in,. the opi;n,ion do .nQt lyol.d that 
such er,videnoe is. _admissible. I ' 
In State v. Haynes, ('Oregon) 253 Pac.. 7, the qties~ 
t~on before the c~ourt wa.s the admissibility in evidence 
'6r a bucket of .nuish. arid a. barr~l still, and not a. herarsay 
s'tatement. In Delaney ·v. United Stlates, 283 U. S. 586, 
'6-8 L. Ed. 462; 44 Sup. Ct. 206, the. Court said that a- con-
spirator could testify as to what· a eo..,conspirator stated 
with respe-ct to the conspiracy, but that case did not. hold 
that a person who is not a conspirator, Kempner, eould 
testify that Stuhe,ck told him, Kempner, that he, Stu-
beek, eollere~~ted mioney from the .card games and took it 
over. to Harmon,,and Harmon divided it wit~h Erwin and 
his crowd. You will not find any case anywhere decided 
by any eourt tha.t. that ,sort of testimony is admissible. 
~f this opinion is finally adopted this will be the only 
opinion in existence that uphoids such a strange doc-
trine. The- writer of the opinion ·constantly confuses 
the 1a,nguage of witnesses and the language of the de-
CISions. The cases do no·t hold that ''A'' may testify 
that '·''B '' told ''A~~· that '' 10'' told ''B.'' something. That 
is ex.a:ctly what this .opinion hol~s. 
: In .Boo-th v~ Nelson, 61 Bta]l 239, 21.1 Pac. 985, this 
C:ou:ft. ·held that in order Jo .cume within the res gestae 
r11le.~ the· :staJytemen( had to be $:po~t·aneous., institnctive, 
and ;connected with. 'the ma.in or pri1wip·a.l :event or trahbS'-
acti_on and result. from the imm,;ediarte and .present.~itn­
fluenae$:rof the main ev·ent and \be cont.emporafne·oUs·with 
it. If the Co-qr:t :w:ants to overrule the .· N els·on 0ase it 
I ' • 
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should d-o so ·with greater regard to· the seriousness of 
suc.h a step than is eYinred in the opinion under consid-
eration. 
An. oral admission of a party can be ·shown only 
by the testimony of a person who heard it; ·a Wit~ 
ness who did not hear the admission cannot testi-
fy as to what a person "~ho did hear it told him 
about it. (22 Corpus Juris 206.) 
Justice \\ olfe agrees "~ith us that it "~as error to 
admit the above referred to Kempner testimony, but 
unfortunately con:cludes that alth.ough it was error it 
was not prejudicial error. 
If you take out of the record- "~hat the witness 
Record .said Pearce said the mayor said; and if you 
take out of the record what Record said that Pearce said 
that the mayor reques~ed Pearce to do; and then if you 
eliminate from the record ·what Holt said ·Harmon said 
Pearoo said and what Holt said Harmon said that Finch 
said, and then eliminate from the record what Kempner 
said Stu beck said Harmon said, then the only proof you 
have of the corpus delecli so far as this appellant is 
concerned are the so-called admissions. 
· The conduct of appellant at the instance testified 
to by: Mrs. Runzler is not an admission. What the opin-
ion states Fisher Harris said is not shown to have been 
hea:.rd by appellant and n.othing in the record that Hun-
saker testified to constitutes an admission that -'estab-
lishes the guilt .of appellant. If they are admissions 
they tCan not be used to ·prove· the corpus deleeti.' 
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If the court eared to, it could write a much stronger, 
a much more logical, and a much more per,suasive opin-
ion reversing tthe ·Case as to appellant than it has w·ritten 
affirming the case. If the court is looking for matters 
tha.t prejudice appellant and matters that support the 
presumption of innocence they are easily found because 
the record is full of them. 
IV. 
THE CO.U.RT DE:CTDIDD THAT THEi NUMEROUS ERRORS FOUNID 
IN T·H·E REICORD WERE NOT INCONSE,QUENTIAL AND 
ERRONffiOUSiLY DEICIDE[) THAT SAID EIRRORS DID NOT 
PREiJU:DI'CE .AJPPEiLLANT. 
The errors referred to were prejudicial. 
In State v. Jensen, 75 Utah 299, 279 Pac. 506, this 
Court held that it would he presumed that error of the 
kind under discussion was prejudicial. It .stated: 
We also are of the opinion that the admission of 
such objectionable testimony was. prejudicial. The 
natural tendency of it wa.s to do harm. From such 
kind of error prejudice will be presun1ed, until 
by the record it is affirmatively sho"\\rn the error 
was not or could not have been of harmful effect. 
Jensen v. Utah R. Co., (Utah) 270 Pac. 349. From 
the record it cannot be told that the objectionable 
testin1ony did not influence the jury in the rendi-
tion of the verdict. * * * 
See also the case of Parlton v. United States, 75 
F-ed. ( 2d) 772, which held as follows : 
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X or can it be properly contendPd. as "·as sng-
g~sted in the original brief of the goYerninent, 
that the error 'Yas harnlless. The g·enerally 
applied rule is that when errn·r a ppt"\a i·.s in th.e 
record it is pres1uned to be injurious unless it 
appears beyond any doubt that it did not and 
could not prejudice the rights of the parties. * * 
* (Italies ours). 
The record is saturated "ith error. Error was 
repeatedly committed. It was purposely committed. 
Error was committed without any regard to the rights 
of the defendants. Errors were shamefully committed 
and continuQusly committed. In referring to the opening 
statement of the District Attorney the opinion states: 
It covers 73 pages of the transcript and in it the 
District ..Attorney attempted to recite verba:tim 
practically all of the many conversations which be 
intended to pro-ve. A number of these conversa-
tions u:ere obt·iously hearsay, and were not ad-
mitted in evidence. In several of these instances 
the court instructed the jury to disregard the 
District Attorney's statement of them. In other 
cDn\ersations the recital in the opening statement 
was more fav.orable to the state than when later 
testified to by the witnesses. There were many 
objections interposed, and the oourt repeatedly 
admonished the jury that the statements of the 
District Attorney should not be considered by 
them as evidence, and a number of times asked 
the District Attorney to make his statements more 
general and to omit hearsay evidence. F1or a 
short time after these admonitions the District 
Attorney followed them, but soon drop·ped back 
into his old habit. 
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,<~.un :_Sq; reg~rdles-s, of.-.the· instru~tlon$ of '.th~:! C<n1x:t, the 
State!:s; A.tto·rn~.y was·~<lete;ITn.lined to bias .and prej~dice 
the jury·.and to·win:the verdict at,alLcos.ts ..... :,1·-· 1 ' 
' t't ::ca~not be ,said that such coriduc't did not influence 
the jury prejudtc1n,ny. I Again the· opinion states: 
The · Di$trict .·Attorney went way beyond ··what 
'Yas proper. 
. . . : 'The· error is cumulated. It is much more grave 
in'· this case than- it was in the Vasquez case recently 
decided by this C;ourt. 
v. 
THE. COURT IDRRONEOUSL.Y DIDCI'DEJD THAT ERRORS ID 
:ADMITTEIDLY ,'PREJUDIC'ItAL TO APPELLANT' AND RE-
, PEATEDLY INtDU.LGElD lN WEREi CURED BY THE 
ADMONfTION OF T·HE COURT, WHEN AS A MATTER OF 
·~AOT. THE · EIRROR COMMIT·TED WA:S ONtL:Y MAGNIFIED 
AND IDMPHA:S'IZE[) BY SU:CH .A!DMONITION . 
. . · · ,The ·n~mer~us errors ·committed in the intr~duction 
of. evidence coupled with the persistent imprope.r ~state­
ments made by State's C'ounsel to the jur.y constitute 
r~\r.etsible ··error. This er_t6t is Jiot cuted even· though 
' . ': . ' ' . ~ ' ' . 
the :trial -:court I doe.s ~sustain objections· t-o it,. and even 
tli~:nigh the· trl.al.court undertakes to is trike such evidence 
and ·sue~ improper ';statements f:r.orn the re~o-rd. An 
occasional inadvertent error !or:f the prosecuto~ may be 
eured by the trial court hy admonishing the jury not 
to ·consider it, and. an 'Oecasional improper question may 
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also be thus cured·. But ;where the objectionable· ques-
tions are repeatedly asked and repeatedly ruled on, and 
where the objeetionable statements are repeatedly 1nade 
and repeatedly ruled on, the error thus co~tted is not 
and cannot be cured by the usual .admoniti~n of the 
Court. 
This Court in Sta.fe v. Alartinez, 56 Utah 351, 19~1 
Pac. 214, ·Se\erely criticized the prosecuting attorney 
and reversed the e.ase for an error much less grave than 
the admitted errors committed in this case. With wither-
ing language it denounces the persistent misconduct of 
State's Counsel. It calls attention to the fact that the 
District Attorney stands before the jury representing 
the majesty of the law; that he has the implicit confidence 
of the jury, which usually is well deserved; and that 
under such circumstances when the prosecutor makes 
statements of the kind under discussion it is bound to 
prejudice the defendant. The language of this Court 
in that case on this subject is as follows : 
The district attorney stood before the jury rep-
resenting the majesty of the law, and no doubt 
had the implicit confidence of the jury, which was 
well deserved~ The case at best W<JS exceedingly 
close, and~ the evidence complicat!3d and i/!ifficul:t 
to digest. In these circumstances the defendant 
was aJ a decided disadvo;ntage. ·-When the district 
attorney .said that the defendant had admitted- the 
·shooting, and. r~iterated . the statement ip th~ 
presence of the_ jury, they must have thought that 
· ' · by some .·implication of law ·an·. admission by 
·. ·. defendant had actually been made.. In view of 
.. the circumstances, .. we think the statemen1 was 
prejudicial error: (Italics ours). · 
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It wa~s the duty of State's Counsel t1o act impartially 
and in the interest only of justice. He should not become 
a heated partisan. It i~sn 't his duty to seek to procure 
a conviction at all hazards. When he does that he ceases 
to properly represent the public interest. The State 
demands no conviction. It should seek no conviction 
through the aid of pas~sion, sympathy, or resentment. 
Vickers v. United States, 1 Okla. Cr. 452, 98 Pac. 467: 
A public prosecutor is presumed to a:ct impar-
tially in the interest only of justice. If he lays 
aside the impartiality that ,should -characterize 
his official action, to become a heated partisan, 
and by vituperation rof the prisoner, and appeals 
to prejudice, .seeks to procure a conviction at all 
hazard·s, he ceases to properly represent the pub-
lic interest, which demands no victim, and seeks 
no conviction through the aid .of passion, ~sym­
pathy, or resentment. The only way to seeure 
fair trials is to set. aside the verdic.t so procured. 
In a civil suit where damages for personal injuries 
are sought, almost the mere mention of the fact that 
defendant is insured by an insurance company consti-
tutes reversible error, and all that-- is at .stake is a few 
dollars. But here, life and liberty are at stake,-rep-
utations, money, ·everything is at stake. If it is preju-
dicial error in a civil action to prejudice a jury against 
defendant by improper .conduct of 0ounsel for the plain-
tiff, ·certainly in a criminal ~aetion like .conduct on the 
part .of the State's counsel i·s prejudicial error. In 56 
A. L. R., page 1492, there is an annotation on this 
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subject a.s it affects eiYil suits. The annotation is brought 
down to a very much later date. The annotator's lan-
guage in this annotation is so apt that w·e take the liberty 
of quoting part of it : 
llany eourts have taken the position that the pre-
judicial effect of an attempt to inject iinproperly 
into the trial of a negligence case, ·by evidence, 
statements. or arguments, 1natters fflom "~hich the 
jury might infer that the defendant was insured 
against liability, cannot be cured by its exclusion 
and by instruction to the jury to disregard it. 
Their position is that evidence that the defendant 
in an action for negligence is insured in a casualty 
company, or that the defense is being conducted 
by such company, is n{)t only inc-ompetent, but so 
danger-ous and prejudicial as to require a rev-ersal 
e z_·e n when the court strikes it from the record 
and directs the jury to disregard it. * * * The 
theory is that the very fact that objections are 
interposed to such questions may be, and prob-
ably is, more prejudicial to the defendant than 
-otherwise, for by {)bjection the matter is partic-
ularly called to the attenti1on of the jury; and, on 
the other hand, a party should not be deprived 
of his prinlege to urge a valid objection because 
a greater prejudice might follow; he should not 
be ·subjected to a possible penalty for insisting 
upon a proper regard for his right, but rather 
the penalty, if penalty there be, should be visited 
upon the real party in fault, even in the absence 
of an affirmative answer. 
State's counsel should not be permitted to resort to 
the practice of violating the law of evidence, trusting 
that the error will be cured by the usual impotent instruc-
tion to the jury to disregard it. In this case the state-
ments of State'·s counsel were unwarranted and illegiti-
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niate and·to~·disregard them would not only make atrial 
a useless sham, but it would convert it into a judicial 
farce. The ·error, of improperly getting· to the jury by 
s-tatement, arguments, or testimony is prejudiciaL ~It is 
p·~esumed to ~e· prejudicial. One can hardly say that 
s;bite;1s attorney was not persi,stent and did not intend 
to win at all co-sts. This court points out that several 
time~ the trial court instructed the jury to disregard 
the District Attorney's statement and .asked the District 
Attor~ey to make "his ~statements more general and to 
~omit hearsay. The opinion states: 
The District Attorney f.ollowed them, but soon 
dropp·ed back into his old habit of placing before 
the jury imp11oper statements. · 
With the consent of the Court, appellant has filed a 
supplemental petition for a rehearing, alleging that the 
Court erred in finding the indictment sufficient. This is 
the first intimation we have had that without being sup-
ported by a Bill' of' Particular's the indictment was suffi-
·cieilt.' The opinion states on the bottom o.f page 2 that 
the question ~of whether 'Or not an· indictment can be cured 
by a Bill of P·articulars is not before the. Court because 
"tbi~s indictment is ·.sufficient without the Bill of Particu-
lars.'' · An informatri·on -containing the meagre allega-
tions that this· indictment co~ tained was held to be insuffi-
cient in State v. Lund, 75 Utah 559, 286 Pac. 960. And 
this indictment is ·not sufficient if tested by the other 
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cases cit~_ in appellant's brief commeneing at t4e.b~t~ 
of.page 14. 
The indictment has been skeletinized in appellant's 
original brief. The particulars in 'Yhich the indicbnent 
is insufficient are set out in the brief and are so obvious 
that a further discussion of them would not be profitable. 
1 do not think the writer of the opinion can fairly say 
that those particulars are not sufficiently pointed out. 
(Opinion, page 2) It \\as because the indictment was 
insuffieient that the Court required the state to particu-
larize. (Appellant's brief, page 13.-Laws of Utah, 1935, 
Section 105-21-9). See State of Utah vs. Sid K. Spencer, 
opinion on Petition for rehearing N.o. 6223. 
CONCLUSION. 
There are upwards of thirty distinct instances in 
the opinion where either misstatements of the evidence 
or of the applicable la" iOceur, or where the evidence 
is so obviously misinterpreted and given effect as inter-
preted, as to be entirely misleading. We have not sought 
to set out each of these instances, but in the brief of 
appellants Finch and Pearce and in this brief they will 
sufliciently appear to demonstrate the necessity, or if 
not the absolute necessity the very great desirability, 
of granting a rehearing in this cause. We believe that 
we can clearly demonstrate to the Court on re-argument 
where we can meet the judges face to face that many 
grave injustices will be done if this opinion is allowed 
to stand in its present form. We als-o are firmly of the 
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belief that we can convince the c~ourt that by the decisions 
of this Court and the law of this State appellants are 
entitled to a reversal. Because of the seriousness of 
the charges and the way it inevitably affects appellants, 
we very earnestly request that we be given an oppor-
tunity to again argue this matter to this Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BuRTON W. MussER, 
EDWARD F. RICHARDS, 
Attorneys for Appellant, 
E. B. Erwin. 
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